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This chapter considers the significance of hierarchy in Scottish organised 
crime: the evidence that supports its existence and the conditions that are 
necessary for its occurrence. In doing so the chapter examines how Serious 
Organised Crime Groups (‘SOCGs’) in Scotland compete in their principal 
markets, both criminal and legitimate, focussing on the market factors and 
dynamics that are necessary for survival, endurance and dominance. On 
this basis, a platform for analysis is proposed which is designed to assist in 
identifying the distinctive capabilities of dominant SOCGs and how these 
have enabled the development of the strategic assets form the basis of their 
hierarchical strength. A practical application of this approach is proposed 
to enable SOCG vulnerabilities to be identified such that their activities 
and influence, not least in legitimate markets, can be curtailed, or at least 
more effectively constrained.  
 
 
Tackling organised crime in Scotland 
 
The official approach to tackling serious organised crime in Scotland is set 
by a Scottish Government body known as the ‘Serious Organised Crime 
Task Force’ (‘SOCTF’). SOCTF uses a thematic strategy known as the 4 
‘D’s (Detect, Disrupt, Divert and Deter), which emphasises awareness rais-
ing and partnership working, as well as traditional law enforcement 
                                                          
1  The author is Head of Forensic Accountancy at Police Scotland. The views 




measures, in an effort to demonstrate that Scotland is a hostile environment 
for organised crime. Within law enforcement, the principal operational de-
cisions about how resources should be deployed in this context are set by 
a mapping process, known as Serious Organised Crime Mapping 
(‘SOCM’). This process collates all available relevant intelligence relating 
to serious organised crime (‘SOC’) and ranks SOCGs in accordance with 
how they score on a harm matrix. This scoring process explicitly identifies 
and defines these groups according to structures of hierarchy: SOCGs are 
essentially discerned by means of tracked hierarchical relationships be-
tween individual SOCG players (known as ‘nominals’) within them.  
 The SOCM process provided much of the source material for a recent 
Scottish Government study entitled ‘Serious Organised Crime in Scotland: 
A Summary of the Evidence’ (Scottish Government, 2017). In considering 
what it referred to as ‘the evidence’ about serious organised crime in Scot-
land, this document augmented interpretations of mapping data with a re-
view of academic literature. It drew the conclusion that “in order to disrupt 
and weaken SOC activity, a fuller understanding of the structure, opera-
tion and behaviour of SOC groups is required.” On this foundation the 
report assessed:  
 
“. . . it is important to recognise that while SOC groups are often very 
hierarchical and highly structured, SOC groups come in a variety of 
shapes and forms, which also includes very loose networks of criminal 
actors . . . Recognising the diverse structures and compositions of SOC 
groups is critical to understanding how SOC can be tackled.” (pp. 16-
17). 
 
It is one thing to observe that a garden is full of many different flowers (or 
maybe we should say weeds) but another to explain how they actually 
grow. What do they need to grow? Why do some, if they are allowed to, 
appear to take over the whole allotment? The ‘social construct’ conception 
of organised crime, whereby all the various kinds of collective criminality 
that might attract the ‘OC’ label are collected under an ‘umbrella’ (Von 
Lampe, 2016 a and b), provides a suitable basis for describing the many 
facets of organised crime, but its value as a guide to SOC dynamics is lim-
ited. Recognising diversity of SOC type in itself does little to assist in de-
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vising strategies of tackling its harms. What is required is a way of under-
standing SOCGs primarily in terms of what they do rather than how they 
can be described or classified.  
 
Hierarchy versus network – a false dichotomy 
 
Re-focussing on what SOCGs do serves some way to providing clarity on 
the vexed question of whether SOC can be best conceived in terms of a 
market/hierarchy framework or a network structure (Campana, 2016b). In 
simple terms: SOCGs are formed because some crimes requiring a measure 
of organising to carry them out. One-off crimes may only require tempo-
rary arrangements which can dissolve when the crime is complete. Where 
there is a profit to be made from repeat activity, then a mode of association 
that might be described as organisation starts to form. It might of course be 
argued that there are other formational influences on organised crime 
groups than the market, but the Finckenauer assertion that “making a profit 
is in fact the primary goal of organised crime groups” (Finckenauer, 2005: 
66) is a difficult one to refute. This is not the same as saying all organised 
crime groups have been formed in response to market opportunities. But it 
does imply that, whatever their provenance, they have to adapt to the mar-
kets they participate in to survive, or otherwise they fail. The market im-
poses an organisational conduct. The question is how do SOC players en-
gaged in criminal markets associate in order to accommodate the condi-
tions that they face?  
 There is a tradition in the academic literature which posits a contrast 
between SOC conceived in terms of ‘mafias’ or hierarches, and concep-
tions based on networks. Morselli described a ‘debate’ between law en-
forcement treatments of SOC and network based treatments favoured by 
academics.  
 
“The debate in brief is whether the organisation of the distribution of 
illegal drugs is more likely an orthodox pyramid-based governance 
structure regulated by strong-hand criminal dictators, or the ‘arms-
length’ transactional process (Naylor, 1997) that so resembles dealings 
in legitimate cross border business” (Morselli, 1999: 27). This point of 
view was given further amplification by Dick Hobbs: “the notion of 
crime groups as tightly organised hierarchical entities whose tentacles 
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reach around the globe is not supported by the evidence, and this market 
should be understood as one that is populated by networks or partner-
ships of independent traders or brokers.” (Hobbs, 2013: 156) 
 
In Hobbs’ view, associating ‘mafia’s’ with territorial domination is no 
longer valid, SOC markets are more accurately characterised as “different 
kinds of brokerage and ever-mutating, interlocking networks featuring a 
variety of links with similar entities in other neighbourhoods.” (Hobbs, 
2013: 218).  
 So, why does hierarchy continue to have relevance in Scottish SOC? 
The Scottish Government report clearly accepts that structured hierarchical 
SOCGs still exist, something that will be evidenced in more detail below.  
The Scottish SOC theatre, especially in the Central Belt, continues to 
demonstrate the existence of dominant territorial influences, although it is 
fair to say from current practitioner experience the foundations for domi-
nance may be moving away from territory to ability to access supply routes 
and specialist services. The SOCM process on the other hand is based on 
understanding the associative links that connect SOC in Scotland across a 
network. The SOC challenge in Scotland therefore involves modes of as-
sociation within illegal markets that are both hierarchical and which in-
volve networks. This would appear to chime with Campana’s assertion that 
in order to capture the reality of SOC, an instrumental approach to net-
works is needed which is able to elucidate the continuum that exists be-
tween market conduct and hierarchic operating in its various forms (Cam-
pana, 2016b). Any meaningful analysis of Scottish SOC therefore has to 
accommodate both types of association. There is a continuing need to ar-
ticulate how hierarchical influence continues to arises and flourish in SOC 
and how this influence interacts with, and is expressed through, network 
forms of association.  
 
Transactional dynamics in understanding SOC 
 
What are the key factors or characteristics that account for economic suc-
cess in organised crime? Answering this satisfactorily requires an under-
standing of the dynamic forces that form, nurture, create and destroy 
SOCGs. Categorisations in accordance with type, shape, form, or other de-
fining factors such as ethnicity, inform in terms of describing groups of 
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participants engaged in SOC, but descriptions in themselves don’t tell us 
enough about how or why SOCGs succeed or fail; what factors are at play 
in determining these outcomes, and also the many partial successes and 
failures that lie between them. 
 All SOCs transact. They all deal in criminal markets and most above a 
certain level deal in legitimate markets too. Analysis of the attributes and 
characteristics that enable SOCs to transact successfully in these markets 
can answer many of the questions that arise in relation to them: for example 
those relating to identity, purpose, character, method, vulnerabilities and 
weaknesses. It follows that a better understanding of the constituent factors 
that make SOCs successful in transacting with others will in turn provide 
better understanding of the forces that influence the development of SOC 
structure. For example, in terms of understanding how hierarchical struc-
tures interact with network structures, and why hierarchical structures con-
tinue to be suited to market dynamics at the top end of markets and why 
networks are more suited to the bottom end, where they are the dominant 
form of association.  
 Illegal drug markets rely on longitudinal interfaces between hierarchical 
and network modes of structure which have to function together. High 
value importations and street corner retail are two ends of the same busi-
ness process, and the part played by an SOCG in that process is determined 
by what they are able to contribute to it. In most cases this refers to what 
they are allowed to do in these markets in accordance with whatever hier-
archical influences they are subject to. The influence of hierarchy in other 
words is not a concept that is best considered in opposition to network 
forms of association, but rather, in the context of SOC, an influence that is 
present and part of the networks, both relevant to all serious SOC markets. 
Because of this, the existence of hierarchical influence in these markets 
provides a door of analysis through which the networks they interact with 






The Serious Organised Crime Mapping Process 
(‘SOCM’) 
 
It is on the basis of identifying hierarchical relationships that the SOCM 
process approaches its challenge of identifying and prioritising SOC 
threats and where they come from. Using intelligence data sweeps from all 
relevant intelligence sources throughout Scotland, this process categorises 
featured players in the relevant intelligence disseminations as principals, 
members, associates and rivals. The network analysis applied to the rele-
vant intelligence considers the suitability of each nominal to these classifi-
cations (using a variety of sources, such as telephone billings and surveil-
lance logs). Using conventional network analysis tools, the process as-
sesses connectedness of nominals, or nodes, and these are differentiated in 
terms of degree and between-ness centrality (essentially in the same way 
as Morselli discusses in his analysis of Canadian Hell’s Angels) (Morselli, 
2010). High degree centrality counts the number of connections, whereas 
between-ness centrality assesses the strategic importance of connections 
between otherwise disconnected others. 
 The base objective of this stage in the SOCM process is to establish 
what the hierarchical relationships are (as defined on this basis). These are 
then used to build an understanding of group structure. In this regard, the 
nominals identified as ‘principals’ and ‘members’ are of most importance. 
‘Associates’ often demonstrate a high degree of centrality, but may flit 
from ‘group’ to ‘group’ or influence to influence. In strategic terms, how-
ever, these nominals may be important enablers, providing specialist ser-
vices to a number of groups or centre of influence. The data sweep is then 
used to develop an understanding of the activities and capabilities of each 
group through the compilation of a harm matrix. This generates a threat 
score supported by a justification document. The organised crime groups 
are ranked in accordance with their threat score and this is fed into the 




 The latest available mapping report at the time of writing2 provides the 
following profile of organised crime groups and connections:  
▪ 132 Serious Organised Crime Groups (SOCGs) were mapped;  
▪ 89 of these SOCGs contained a total of 335 individuals who had con-
nections to multiple groups; the most connected individuals (i.e. those 
individuals with links to more than 7 SOCGs) were all principals of 
their own group and each had links to at least 9 groups including their 
own;  
▪ the 13 most connected nominals were linked to a total of 37 SOCGs;  
▪ of 84 nominals identified as specialists, one quarter were identified as 
being connected to more than one group.  
▪ 70% of SOCGs (104) were involved in ‘quasi-legitimate’ enterprises 
involving 674 identified companies. 
 
SOCM provides an indicator of what harm SOCs threaten most as con-
veyed by historic intelligence. The quality of that intelligence is therefore 
crucial to the value of the SOCM output. Over the past five years, there has 
been a concerted effort within Police Scotland to broaden the base of the 
intelligence captured, and financial and business intelligence is now given 
an emphasis commensurate with the more traditional areas of law enforce-
ment intelligence gathering.  
 SOCM relies on establishing group identity through identification of 
hierarchical relationships between individuals (known as ‘nominals’). 
While this can enable hierarchical relationships between SOC groups to be 
discerned, it cannot on its own provide an analysis of the market and trans-
actional dynamics that underpin hierarchical intra group relationships. 
SOCM in other words identifies which SOCGs are most active and possess 
most threat, but requires this further mode of analysis to determine why 
these SOCGs are prominent in the rankings. What are the factors that got 
them there and keep them there?  The incorporation of transactional dy-
namics into the picture, therefore, requires a further mode of analysis in 
order to complete the picture when it comes to understanding hierarchy. 
That mode of analysis must be capable of providing a dynamic dimension 
                                                          
2  The source is the Scottish Organised Crime Group Mapping Report (SOGM) 
2017/19 Q4 and Year End April 2018, which is a classified document and is 
not included in the list of references provided below 
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to the periodic snapshot pictures provided by SOCM. Recent law enforce-
ment successes in Operation Escalade provided an outstanding field oppor-





In 2017, the Escalade SOCG was ranked number one not only in the Scot-
tish mapping rankings, but also those relating to the UK as a whole. Of 
particular significance in the context of examining hierarchical influence, 
a number of other high-ranking Scottish SOCGs (i.e. within the top ten in 
the SOCM rankings) were also the Escalade SOCGs customers.  
In December 2017, nine individuals connected with the Escalade SOCG 
were convicted for a variety of organised crime offences.  Each of these 
individuals was identified by the SOCM as a ‘serious organised crime’ 
player. At the relevant High Court hearing, prosecuting counsel, Alex 
Prentice QC, described the relevant SOCG group as follows: 
 
“The Organised Crime Group is the most sophisticated group encoun-
tered by Police Scotland. Their operation centres on the importation of 
vast quantities of cocaine. Their role is as wholesalers to other organ-
ised crime groups. They are the top of the chain in terms of drugs trans-
actions in Scotland and the United Kingdom as a whole. The amount of 
cash and firearms recovered in this case was indicative of an interna-
tional operation.” (Daily Record, 2017b) 
 
The picture painted by Mr Prentice for the court was designed to convey 
how serious the crimes were and how worthy the convicted individuals 
were of substantial sentences. The individuals convicted, however, were 
not the principals of that group, but essentially constituted its core opera-
tional management in Scotland. The lead principals of the SOCG were 
other nominals identified in SOCM, whose methods of delegation and dis-
placement enabled them, up to that point (at the time of writing it is an 
ongoing operation), to protect themselves from direct evidential connec-
tion with the crimes for which the operatives who worked for them were 
convicted. In February 2019, these lead individuals were identified pub-
licly as Barry and James Gillespie (Sunday Mail, 2019), and they remain 
at large at the time of writing.   
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 The size of the cash hauls involved from Operation Escalade disclosed 
at trial amounted to some £1,6 million, a signifier of the operational im-
portance of the convicted individuals to the SOCG. In terms of the esti-
mated profits earned by the SOCG, this amount was estimated to be 
roughly equivalent to the revenues it earned across the UK in one week. 
The circumstances leading to their arrest and conviction directly related to 
the debt enforcement methods they used when seeking payment for supply 
of imported cocaine. The press reports provided lurid detail of these meth-
ods, which included extended torture of a victim debtor including chain 
whippings, treating his open wounds with bleach, shooting him in both 
knee caps and rolling him down a hill close to his home. The drug debt 
owed by the victim concerned was only £30.000; in the course of his or-
deal, however, he was advised by one of his tormentors that: “It wasn’t the 
money, it was the principle”. The need to be seen to exert discipline in 
respect of a relatively low debt indicated the importance accorded by the 
SOCG to its reputation, one which still persists. The ability to dispense 
violence by itself, however, does not explain how the Escalade SOCG 
managed to acquire such a degree of dominance. Most SOCGs in Scotland 
are well capable of violence. So the exceptional success and market domi-
nance of the Escalade SOCG requires some further explanation. 
 As indicated, the business of the Escalade SOCG was the supply of high 
purity drugs to high level customers, for the most part other high ranking 
SOCGs. The Escalade SOCG was a primary importer of Class A drugs into 
Scotland, and also managed and controlled supply lines into London, Liv-
erpool and Manchester. The key attribute that enabled the SOCG to attain 
this position was the direct supply contacts it had established with producer 
cartels in South America, enabling it to control the importation and 
transport of commodity across Europe and in the UK itself, and bypassing 
more established European channels of supply. The Escalade SOCG in-
stead developed its own supply chain by creating an extensive network of 
logistics and physical storage assets across Western Europe, extending in 
particular into the Iberian Peninsula. Through a network of warehouses and 
transport vehicles it was able to co-ordinate transports of imported com-
modity from their landing points, mainly on the Iberian coast, to locations 
in the Netherlands. Stock piles of commodity were accumulated in Dutch 
warehouses to form a ‘mother-load’ from which wholesale shipments 
could be dispensed to the UK. In this way, the SOCG was able to control 
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and maintain desired wholesale price levels on the British mainland. Once 
imported, the management of supply to major UK distributors was 
achieved through a network of warehouses and transactional relationships 
with high ranking Scottish SOCGs, each of whom were able to exert their 
own regional dominance in order to exert the necessary discipline and con-
trol of widely dispersed local distribution networks. 
 All distributors supplied with Escalade commodity were subject to de-
tailed oversight and scrutiny through the monitoring of activity and finan-
cial accounts – an effort supported, where and when required, by enforce-
ment techniques characterised by extreme violence, including murder, ab-
duction, torture, firearms and the use of bladed weapons. In some cases, 
this has led to tensions developing with some of the other major SOCG 
nominals in Scotland, or the businesses they are/were associated with. 
(Daily Record, 2017b) 
 The character of the Escalade SOCG’s transactional relations (as dis-
closed by SOCM), together with the hierarchical traits characteristic of 
many of their customers, underpin the assertion that hierarchy is still a 
prominent feature in Scottish SOC. Given the apparently dominant influ-
ence these SOCGs have in Scotland, particularly in the area covered by its 
high population density, the ‘central belt’ between Glasgow and Edin-
burgh, the roots of that dominance are to be analysed in terms of the par-
ticular capabilities necessary to achieve and sustain their hierarchical posi-
tions. The most obvious way to examine how such hierarchical relation-
ships form and relate to each other is to consider how they exert themselves 
in what are still the principal criminal markets: those of Class A drug sup-
ply. Examining the process through this door enables exploration of the 
relationships between SOCGs, and how they interact with looser retail net-






The shape of supply lines - the ‘class A’ drugs market 
in Scotland 
 
Intelligence disseminations relating to the principal SOCGs involvement 
in Class A drugs markets indicate the following outline profile of the rele-
vant supply chains: 
 The structure presented at the next page, appears consistent with the 
generic view of Scottish SOC taken in the Scottish Government paper 
(Scottish Government, 2017), in that the top end is characterised by hier-
archical structures and the bottom end by looser network structures. Given 
the illegal nature of the activity, it is not a surprise this should be so. At the 
top end, importation requires access to significant resources, not least fi-
nancial, to participate in the relevant transactions. At the bottom end, visi-
ble street level retail transactions require the deployment of expendable 
human assets where the linkages to controlling forces have to be obscured. 
A further feature of significance is that cash management is a separate pro-
cess from drug distribution management, with the detail of cash collection 
mechanisms closely guarded.  
 
Figure 1 
Scheme of supply chains between organised crime groups 
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The key frontier is the level at which the controlling influences interface 
with the local distribution and retail networks. This is represented above 
by the red dotted line. There is a simple way to ascertain where an individ-
ual stands in relation to this frontier in Scotland: above this dotted line, the 
consignments are dealt in kilos or fractions of kilos; below this dotted line, 
the units are dealt in imperial measure: principally ounces or fractions 
thereof (although, confusingly, some retail bag amounts for sale at street 
level are measured in grams).  
 The size of the financial commitment involved at the top of the scale, 
at the importation level, can be gauged from the major drug seizure in the 
spring of 2016 in the North Sea by the NCA, working with Police Scotland, 
in Operation Screenplay (The Herald, 2016). A Turkish trawler, MV 
Hamsun, was intercepted in the North Sea off the east coast of Scotland. 
The NCA ‘deep rummage’ team were called in to examine and search the 
impounded vessel. After an extensive and very probing search, an exten-
sive illicit cargo of cocaine was found: it amounted to a haul of 3,2 tonnes. 
Translated into street prices, the value of the haul was in excess of £500 
million.  
 As Reuter (2004) has pointed out the use of street prices to value an 
intercepted cargo is not really justified, in that it doesn’t reflect the true 
value of the commodity in the place and condition where it is found, the 
cost value relevant to these preferred parameters indicated a value of this 
drugs consignment of £80 million plus. MV Hamsun was transporting a 
multi-million pound investment of which a sizeable economic return would 
be expected: likely to be between 50% and 100%3 (Gash, 2016). The return 
expected from this level of investment would have to be realised from a 
revenue stream (i.e. an actual cash stream) sourced from physically dirty 
cash revenues earned at the retail end of the chain, and which involved 
their subsequent collection, secretion, and distribution to investors. The 
processes required to achieve these functions, and thus realise the eco-
nomic return from the multi-million pound investment, would also involve 
the deployment of specific service attributes at various levels of the struc-
ture to enable the revenue to be secured and realised.  
                                                          
3  Gash (2016) uses an estimate of 69%, for example. 
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 The set of required arrangements to harvest the money is almost always 
quite separate from the various co-ordinating arrangements relevant to dis-
tribution of the actual commodity. Again, there is a critical interface to be 
discerned at the level of the red dotted line: the amounts collected from the 
distribution networks below the line represent the accumulated cash re-
source (e.g. the £1,6. million seized in Operation Escalade) that requires to 
be secreted into a company or a bank account through a professionally 
managed laundering process. In some cases this is achieved by physical 
transportation of the cash abroad; in others money is secreted in a network 
of legitimate businesses controlled by specialist financial controllers who 
serve a number of different SOCG clients. 
 Empirical studies of the constituent elements of the chain are often lim-
ited in their scope to those aspects of it that are visible i.e. the local ware-
housing and street retain elements. At these levels, a degree of physical 
contiguousness exists between the commodity and the revenue it generates 
that is not present elsewhere in the chain. If, however, the process arrange-
ments relating to how the required financial return reaches the importers, 
and indeed the investors standing behind the importers, are not properly 
understood – that is, the parts of the process which are usually kept separate 
from the commodity – then the relevant structures may appear to be flatter 
than is actually the case.4  
 The missing elements of the picture derive to a large extent from the 
traditional law enforcement bias that favours commodity as the focus of 
attention, as opposed to the revenue it earns. Given that the players with 
the most power in the relevant governing structures will generally not go 
anywhere near the commodity, this implies that one of the prizes for sen-
iority in this industry is protection, if not immunity, from prosecution. In 
addition, the players at this level must maintain the ability to enjoy access 
to criminal revenue streams. 
 The oft expressed need to do more about ‘high end money laundering’ 
(Financial Times, 2015) is a reflection of the extent to which this problem 
has proved elusive to traditionally equipped law enforcement agencies. 
This is at least partly due to a lack of understanding of what the relevant 
business processes are which secure that revenue. This may also be read as 
                                                          
4  See Gash (2016) for an example of this line of argument, which is based on 
Reuter (2004), and also conversations with him. 
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a testament to the effectiveness of the design of these processes, or at least 
how jealously they are protected. It is an important gap, which counts 
against a proper understanding of the ways SOCGs relate to each other and 
the markets they participate being obtained. 
 A related but equally important challenge, however, is to find ways of 
properly visualising, or conceptualising, the attributes necessary to be able 
to exert the necessary control and influence in these realms. If these attrib-
utes can be properly identified, the prospect opens up of being able to iden-
tify and exploit, from a law enforcement point of view, structural weak-
nesses and vulnerabilities. Understanding the factors necessary for the for-
mation of established hierarchies, therefore, provides an entry point for 
considering the factors which influence all capabilities relevant to partici-
pating in SOC, since hierarchies have to engage with network forms of 
association to profitably participate in these markets. 
 Understanding how those relationships work requires the formulation 
of a suitably based theoretical framework. The objective from a law en-
forcement point of view of developing such a framework would be to de-
velop a practical template that would enable the relevant capabilities to be 
properly identified, so that they can be turned into vulnerabilities that can 
be targeted for law enforcement action.  
 
The formation of firms and the importance of transaction costs 
in both legal and illegal markets 
 
The first step to achieving this understanding is to analyse the dynamics 
that lie behind the relevant transactional relationships. The source of 
wealth and competitive success of any entity, including SOCGs, lies with 
its ability to successfully manage transactions. The entity, or ‘firm’, can 
essentially be defined in terms of the arrangements it engages in to achieve 
that. 
 In Ronald Coase’s analysis (1937; see also Coase, 1960), firms are 
formed where functions and services cannot be accessed from the external 
market at a price which more than compensates for the increased transac-
tion costs associated with dealing with an external supplier. The perform-
ing of these functions and services in-house become specialisations man-
aged internally through hierarchical instructions. Different specialisations 
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by different firms form the basis for the exchange of goods and services 
upon which a market economy is based. The Coase analysis relies heavily 
on the classic assumptions of efficient allocation of resources achieved 
through a properly functioning price mechanism, but the analysis still has 
contemporary relevance to the characteristics of the so called ‘gig’ econ-
omy, which has arisen in many instances as a consequence of the collapse 
of transaction costs across a number of service sectors. Firms are incentiv-
ised to outsource more and more functions as a result and reduce their own 
internal operations to core specialisations. 
 In the field of SOC, it is obvious that the natural discipline of the market 
will not reflect all of the relevant factors at play when determining whether 
or not to transact with another party. Illegal markets confer a number of 
different conditions: the threat of law enforcement; the extent to which a 
trading partner can be trusted in an unregulated environment; the threat of 
violence and so on. These are all factors likely to affect and distort the 
purely economic parameters relating to the relevant trading relationships. 
The theorising necessary to accommodate these features needs therefore to 
be able to accommodate the relevant non-market based features of transac-
tions which can affect transactional outcomes. 
 Drawing on the Coase insights on firm formation, Oliver Williamson 
(1979) constructed a theory of economic activity based on a more detailed 
analysis of the costs and conditions relevant to economic transacting. This 
emphasised that economic organising could be essentially considered a 
problem of contracting, with the ‘critical dimensions’ of transacting being 
those of uncertainty, frequency, and a factor termed ‘asset specificity.’ This 
construct provides insights not only in respect of normal trading in legal 
markets between legal participants, but also SOCG trading in illegal mar-
kets too. 
 There are uncertainties about outcomes in both legal and illegal mar-
kets. Contracts cannot cover all contingencies, however well drawn. Other 
factors have to come into play in terms of the decision to transact with 
another party, the most obvious relating to the critical dimensions of ‘un-
certainty’ and ‘frequency’. For example, in terms of ‘uncertainty’, there 
are always natural boundaries of knowledge (or ‘bounded rationality’) 
which limit the number of possible counterparties that can be engaged with 
and the range of activities it is possible to engage in. Also, the dimension 
of ‘frequency’ in transacting is bound up in notions of trust. In situations 
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where a new contracting party is identified, particularly in the highly cyn-
ical environment of SOC, certain questions arise, such as: am I going to be 
taken advantage of by this person – perhaps even in the same way that I, 
given the same opportunity, might very well take advantage of him? As 
with legal markets, the frequency and recurrence of transacting in illegal 
markets is contingent on the establishment of a suitable measure of trust 
between the transacting parties, and this tends to evolve and develop 
through repeated transacting. Transactions therefore occur in an environ-
ment of constant reputational evaluation and re-appraisal.  
 The Coase/Williamson analyses were both founded on the insight that 
firms and markets were alternative ways to organise transactions, with the 
decision as to which option was taken informed by evaluation of all the 
relevant transaction costs. The corollary of this is that firms tend to evolve 
in a way that encourages specialisms which are managed internally through 
hierarchical corporate structures and application of related cost and 
knowhow advantages exploited in the market place. The firm, as conceived 
by Williamson, is essentially characterised by these ‘extra-market’ special-
isations; the ability to exploit and deploy advantage derived from being 
able to do certain things better than anyone else in that time and space. In 
the case of SOCGs, this state of affairs, where achieved, is partly because 
controllable conditions have been engineered to ensure this is the case, and 
will continue to be the case so long as the advantages conveyed by these 
specialisations prevail. 
 The establishment of these specialisms and their subsequent exploita-
tion in the context of SOC have a particular relation to the formation of the 
third Williamson dimension, namely ‘asset specificity,’ which, in a paper 
entitled ‘Hierarchy and Markets’ (Williamson, 1973), he identified as the 
major indicator of hierarchy formation. It is the way in which SOC relates 
to this concept of ‘asset specificity’ that provides the key to understanding 






The significance of ‘Asset Specificity’ in explaining hierarchy 
formation 
 
‘Asset specificity’ can be defined as the extent to which investments made 
to support a particular transaction have a higher value to the firm than do-
ing anything else. According to Klaus von Lampe, it means that, “certain 
resources such as specialised skills and machinery cannot be flexibly used 
for a variety of purposes.” (Von Lampe, 2016: 149). This is asset specific-
ity explained as if it is a limitation, as if it is a problem to be overcome. 
According to Von Lampe, organisations respond to this asset specificity 
problem in two ways: incorporation of specific skills into the organisation, 
and then backwards and forwards integration of sourcing or raw materials 
and distribution of finished product or service.  
 In SOC, however, asset specificity is not so much a challenge to be 
overcome as a condition to be engineered and then exploited. The principal 
reason for this is that the conditions of asset specificity enable the extrac-
tion of what are referred to as ‘quasi-rents’.  The successful organised 
crime boss looks to engineer conditions which enable control of a particu-
lar service capability, or control over a geographical area or key transit 
channel. The key characteristic of such an advantage is that use of the asset 
of capability is in demand from other users, thus conferring the ability to 
extract quasi-rents and sustain economic power and influence.  
 The two essential characteristics expressed in formal terms, as further 
elucidated by Per Bylund (2011), are high complementarity - the extent to 
which the relevant assets or commodities traded have utility value to a 
broad range of other firms; and low substitutability – the limited scope for 
other firms to access these assets or commodities from another source. 
Where these characteristics are present in respect of an asset, or a traded 
commodity, or a channel through which a commodity is traded, the 
achieved asset specificity conditions are transformed into what is referred 
to as a strategic asset. 
 The asset specificity conditions required to achieve such a strategic as-
set relate not only to the complementarity and substitutability variants in-
digenous to the transaction, but also the time and space in which the trade 
is conducted. Within these variables lie the reasons why certain players and 
groups in SOC exert a lasting influence, whereas others do not. Those able 
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to engineer large scale shipments across borders and sea barriers, for ex-
ample, are able to have an influence over the nature of the commodity sup-
plied, and/or the price conditions, and/or the requirements relating to trans-
portation and importation. All of these factors have the effect of increasing 
the value of the strategic asset of the relevant importation channel – con-
solidating the conditions of high asset specificity necessary for successful 
exploitation of it, to the exclusion of others who do not have access to it. 
 Control over strategic assets that allow dominance over distribution 
channels has been the key driver sustaining the influence of ‘Ndrangheta 
in European drug markets and the Mexican cartels in North America. It is 
also of direct relevance to the Escalade SOCGs prominence in Scotland 
and the UK. In a different theatre of SOC, the same factors were identified 
by Campana (2015b) as explaining hierarchical influence in otherwise very 
disparate African human trafficking networks. Although the dominant 
modes of organisation were best characterised as loose networks, hierar-
chical influence could still be detected, derived from control of bottle-
necks in the transportation process. These were the channels over which 
hierarchical authority could be imposed through the charging of quasi-
rents. 
 
The interaction of hierarchy and networks 
 
As indicated, the trope of opposing hierarchies to networks does not help 
much in terms of understanding the Scottish SOC theatre: the evidence 
from SOCM indicates that hierarchical SOCGs are also active participants 
in network arrangements. The relevant theory relating to networks can, 
however, provide signposts as to what conditions are likely to be more 
suited to network forms of association.  
 Where the conditions amenable to the extraction of quasi rents do not 
exist, it follows that the influence of hierarchy in criminal markets is likely 
to be lessened. In these conditions, loose network type arrangements are 
more likely to be prominent, e.g., in the conduct of cross border low de-
nomination drug transactions. The profile of the Class A drug supply chain 
in Scotland, characterised by the interaction of hierarchies and network, 
sets the challenge of devising analyses which will help explain how hier-
archical SOCGs interact and manage these interactions – in particular those 
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areas of activity where transacting participants do not enjoy strategic asset 
advantages, where the most common form of criminal business organisa-
tion are network formations. 
 Walter Powell identified networks as a means of satisfying the require-
ments of economic transaction making which was separate from the binary 
choice between top-down direction and discrete market exchange (Powell, 
1990). His analysis considered the conditions under which networks were 
most likely to emerge – essentially fields in which knowledge and/or skills 
did not lend themselves to either monopoly control or expropriation by the 
wealthiest bidder. According to Powell, when partners were involved in 
ongoing complementary activities, the relationship between them was 
more likely to lend itself to mutually supportive information sharing. The 
basis of exchange was identified as essentially an exchange of distinctive 
competencies: “Networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, preferen-
tial, mutually supportive actions. Networks can be complex: they involve 
neither the explicit criteria of the market, nor the familiar paternalism of 
the hierarchy” (Powell, 1990: 303). The exchange of distinctive compe-
tencies in terms of knowledge or skills was therefore considered more 
likely to occur in networks. By contrast, where competition occurred on 
the basis of price or manufacturing intensity, networks were less likely to 
be in evidence. 
 There is nothing, however, to prevent exchanges occurring simultane-
ously between entities relying on distinctive competencies for their com-
petitiveness and other entities which rely on strategic assets to assert mar-
ket dominance. The functioning of illegal markets actually requires such 
exchanges. The nature of Scottish drug supply chains requires a degree of 
co-operation between SOCGs of varying degrees of complexity and struc-
ture to enable the market to function.  
 This still leaves the question of how the various modes of organisation 
occurring within SOC gel together to provide coherent functioning mar-
kets. The answer lies in understanding the parameters relevant to the trans-
actions that are necessary to make such markets and supply lines work; 
something that builds on the work of Coase and Williamson to accommo-
date all aspects of why one party transacts with another, and accommodates 




John Kay and the foundations of corporate success 
 
John Kay’s analysis of the factors necessary for corporate success was 
founded on Williamson’s work on transaction cost economics (Kay, 1993). 
According to Kay, contract structure, and therefore organisational form, 
adapts to the characteristics of the type of transactions to be handled. The 
value of any structure therefore lies in relational contracts, and this deter-
mines the mode of business organisation. The firm (including all varieties 
of SOCG) is defined by its contracts (or patterns of repeat transactional 
behaviour in SOCG environments) and relationships. Success, or ‘added 
value’ in a commercial context, is created by putting these contracts and 
relationships together. Differentiating factors between firms therefore lies 
in the quality and distinctiveness of its contracts, with their distinctiveness 
being at least as important as their quality. In most efficient markets, and 
probably all criminal markets, there are limited opportunities to make good 
contracts. The question at the heart of every firm’s strategy, therefore, is 
‘why will we be better at doing this than anyone else?’ 
 Success is obtained by developing a set of relationships which others 
are unable to make. The foundation to ‘adding value’ (which translates to 
being profitable and successful), is some kind of ‘competitive advantage’ 
– some feature of its relationships which other firms lack, and cannot read-
ily produce. Powell’s exchange of competencies alluded in his analysis of 
network arrangements is similarly founded on complementary distinctive 
capabilities. But Kay’s analysis can extend to all types of transacting party, 
whether in the context of network structures or not. The only type of cir-
cumstance where this is not the case is where a firm relies solely, not on 
any such distinctive capability, but on its ability to exploit a strategic asset. 
This may be possible in the case of certain SOCGs, where it has engineered 
control over a supply route, a trading channel, or a key strategic technical 
asset. Even in these circumstances, however, the creation of the strategic 
asset is usually a function of a combination of competitive advantages be-
ing applied which have been founded on different distinctive capabilities. 
So what are these distinctive capabilities? Kay defines them as follows: 
▪ Architecture – Architecture is the network of relational contracts 
within, or around, the firm. Firms might establish these relationships 
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internally (through vertical integration), externally (with partners en-
gaged in the same activities in other theatres), or among a group of firms 
engaged in related activities (networks based on complementarity); 
▪ Reputation – Reputation is the most mechanism for conveying infor-
mation to customers – or in SOCG terms, to partners and potential com-
petitors (perhaps backed by a necessary degree of threat, or, alterna-
tively, through financial muscle); 
▪ Innovation – Innovation can deliver competitive advantage in itself, 
arising from being able to do something before anyone else can. Usu-
ally, however, according to Kay, it is more often associated with gener-
ating returns as a result of combining the innovation opportunity with 
other distinctive capabilities. 
 
According to this analysis, the most powerful firms combine the leverage 
arising from all the distinctive capabilities they have access to and use them 
to re-inforce each other. This in turn can amount to the creation of the kind 
of strategic asset that enables collection of quasi-rents. The deployment of 
distinctive capabilities and/or strategic assets in relevant markets confers 
competitive advantage, and it follows that all successful SOCGs, however 
they are structured, and wherever they appear in criminal supply chains, 
fall to be analysed in these terms. This then offers a basis for constructing 
a means of identifying the key elements that enable SOCGs to function and 
be successful. 
 
Application of the Kay analysis to Escalade 
 
How can this theoretical foundation be applied in such a way as to provide 
workable insights relevant to SOC in practice? The Escalade example 
lends itself to analysis using the following matrix, which is based on the 
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The relevant intelligence and/or information captured in relation to an 
SOCG can be classified according to the boxes of the matrix in order to 
determine its business profile. The left hand side relates to the Kay classi-
fications of distinctive capabilities of architecture and innovation, and the 
right hand side relates to the distinctive capability of reputation as well as 
any strategic assets which can be exploited, such as control over drug dis-
tribution in a particular area or control of a key transit channel. In general 
terms, the K boxes taken collectively in this analysis relate to what an or-
ganisation does, and the ‘C’ boxes taken collectively relate to the markets 
it serves. In the context of an SOCG, however, the ‘C’ boxes usually trans-
late to what it controls, since the way in which SOCGs relate to the markets 
they serve is usually in terms of what they control. 
 Applying this analysis to Escalade, in particular in respect of identify-
ing how it acquired a dominant position in Scottish SOC, the relevant ex-
planatory factors can be broken down into the following distinctive capa-
bilities:    
▪ The key contact relationships that allowed the Escalade group to assert 
itself as a major importer were those it had been able to establish with 
main producers and cartels in South America and Mexico. This enabled 
it to have control over a greater portion of the supply stages, in particu-
lar those parts offering the highest rewards, i.e. the phases transporting 
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the commodity across the Atlantic to Europe and West Africa, and then 
from continental Europe into the UK. The Escalade group did not, 
therefore, rely on supplies already imported to Europe from other par-
ties. In financial terms, this enabled the group to earn gross profits of 
£2 million a week from Scottish drug markets alone, or £100 million a 
year. This revenue enabled the Escalade group to invest in further ca-
pabilities, which had the effect of consolidating and enhancing its com-
petitive position as detailed below; 
▪ The key resources used by the Escalade group included: the warehouse 
network referred to, comprising storage assets in both Scotland and Eu-
rope; transport logistics over land and sea; rigorous internal control pro-
cesses; and also an exclusive access to encrypted phone technology, 
which it also supplied to other SOCGs on a commercial basis;  
▪ In addition to the source contacts it had acquired in South America and 
Mexico, the key business partners were prominent Scottish SOCGs, 
themselves often hierarchical organisations with strong roots to specific 
territories, who served as its primary customer base;  
▪ The key markets in the UK could therefore be accessed through the net-
work of SOCG customers it had established. These provided the local 
distribution capabilities necessary to access and exert a dominant hier-
archical influence over the cocaine and heroin trade in the West of Scot-
land and much of its central belt. The financial success of the Escalade 
SOCG also required a means of collecting the cash realised from retail 
sales and securing it. The way in which this was done became apparent 
in the course of the law enforcement action described below. 
 
The above outline profile identifies the key distinctive capabilities of the 
Escalade SOCG. The methods used by law enforcement to tackle it essen-
tially made use of these distinctive capabilities, by turning them into vul-
nerabilities. The approach can be summarised as follows: 
▪ Concerted surveillance and telephony over a 12-month period led to the 
identification of the principal SOCG customers of Escalade, which it 
supplied by with large quantities of Class A drugs. During the course 
of this first phase of the enquiry, the network of covertly obtained in-
dustrial premises and vehicles was identified. It was established all 
premises occupied had been rented under aliases.  All rental payments 
were made in cash and in advance, limiting contact with landlords in an 
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attempt to leave no evidential trail. Similarly, all of the vehicles identi-
fied were registered and insured to false names and addresses. Group 
members were observed conducting anti-surveillance prior to attending 
at these locations for fear of compromise. 
▪ A further protracted period of surveillance, and other enquiries revolv-
ing around the identified warehouses, was undertaken. This had the ob-
jective of identifying as many of the covertly obtained premises and 
vehicles as possible. During this period, the tradecraft and hierarchy of 
the SOCG was identified and search warrants were obtained for all of 
the covertly obtained premises. 
▪ On a Police Scotland day of ‘executive action’, raids were made on all 
the warehouse premises. This resulted in discovery of: (i) the largest 
weapons cache ever discovered in Scotland; (ii) an extensive collection 
of state-of-the-art anti-surveillance equipment and encrypted phone 
technology; (iii) £1,6 million in cash stored in seismic spring units for 
ease of secretion in lorries and other vehicles.  
▪ DNA evidence from the weapons identified nine senior members of the 
Escalade SOCG. This enabled them to be evidentially linked to the tor-
ture of the debtor who had failed to pay a £30.000 drug debt.  
 
The factors entrenching SOC hierarchical influence in  
Scotland’s central belt 
 
If the principal strategic asset accounting for the Escalade dominance was 
its contact base and supply infrastructure, what accounts for hierarchical 
influence attributable to its principal SOCG customers? In some cases, it 
relates to established dominance over a distinct geographical area; with 
others it relates to its broad network of contacts that enable it access to high 
level drug transaction negotiations. In respect of each of these SOCGs, it 
is the practical measures they take to secure their revenues that most obvi-
ously defines their identity as a group, and the hierarchical relationships 
within that are a principal feature of that group.  
 One of the key benefits of these arrangements is the ability to access 
legitimate markets. Legitimate activities are sometimes undertaken for the 
legal profits to be obtained from them, but in many cases, they serve, either 
directly or indirectly, criminal objectives – money laundering in particular. 
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It follows that assessment of SOCG business models must incorporate le-
gitimate as well as illegitimate activities. The competitive position of a 
prominent SOCG is a function of how it manages and exploits interfaces 
between the two. 
 The most significant way in which Scottish SOCGs have done this has 
been to pool resources through centralised criminal money management 
facilities. Access to these facilities is itself a key distinctive capability 
which enables SOCGs to consolidate their position and accumulate wealth 
behind legitimate facades. The SOCGs with access to these facilities are 
those that feature in the top echelons of the SOCM rankings, which under-
line the impression that the top half of the profile of Class A drug supply 
in Scotland is indeed hierarchical. The extent of hierarchical influence ex-
tends down to the mid-level; aspiring SOCG players emerge from social 
drug networks to assume mid management roles. These roles require par-
ticular skill sets encompassing the ability to exercise discipline through 
threat and the management ability to secure the cash revenues that require 
to be secreted through money laundering portals (McLean et al., 2018). 
These individuals are prominent in SOCG intelligence disseminations, be-
ing the individuals most engaged at the front line, the open face of the hi-
erarchical interests to whom they are answerable.  
 All of these SOCG groups, and indeed key enablers who flit between 
these groups, rely on established reputation to function. This often mani-
fests as control exercised by a level of threat that is commonly perceived 
to be associated with that reputation; the distinctive capability which un-
derpins how they are able to exert influence over the looser networks at the 
retail end of the supply chain. In essence, the expression of hierarchical 
influence is most obvious in the way in which relationships with looser, 
subordinate networks are conducted. In many senses Scottish SOC can be 
considered a network of these hierarchical influences, with the significant 
distinctive and differentiating capability common to each of them being the 
extent to which they are able to access and enjoy that influence in respect 
of these relationships. 
 The validity of this analysis is borne out by recent SOC developments 
in areas of Scotland which are beyond the usual areas of territorial control 
of the central belt based SOCGs (The Sunday Post, 2019). In contrast to 
the central belt, the northern cities of Aberdeen and Inverness do not have 
a tradition of dominant indigenous SOCGs. Accordingly, these markets 
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have always been more open for infiltration by SOCGs from other areas, 
including England and foreign SOCGs. The strategic asset of local market 
dominance is not present, allowing these territories to become open to 





Understanding transactional dynamics is the key to understanding relation-
ships within SOC, in particular hierarchical influence. It is by identifying 
such influence that law enforcement stands the best chance of maximising 
its effectiveness against SOCGs. This falls to be done by targeting not just 
the SOC players and groups with the most influence, but also the capabil-
ities and strategic advantages that sustain their hierarchical position. In 
Scotland, the need to import illegal commodities across a sea border and 
persistent territorial influences have underpinned the continuing influence 
of hierarchical forces, which have successfully adapted to contemporary 
market forces and economic conditions. A key manifestation of that adap-
tation process is the extent to which hierarchical influence is maintained 
through network structures.  
 Given these characteristics, in order to be effective, law enforcement 
responses to the developing challenges of SOC in Scotland requires adop-
tion of analytical tools that will enable understanding of SOC transactional 
capabilities. These capabilities are changing all the time: the networked 
hierarchies of SOC are particularly well suited in terms of their sets of 
competitive advantages to dominate and exploit many emerging dynamic 
criminal markets. If unchecked, they will confer increasing governance 
power and SOC influence over legitimate as well as illegitimate markets, 
which is a developing feature of SOC hierarchical influence in Scotland. 
Access to professional assistance at a level capable of sustaining credible 
presence and influence in legitimate markets, not always in sectors with 
which SOC has been traditionally associated, provides a further raft of dis-
tinctive capabilities which serve to confer and sustain hierarchical influ-
ence.  
 Failure to control the corruptive capability of such influence – which is 
a function of increasing accumulations of criminal profits being deployed 
in legitimate markets – is likely to result in increasing SOC governance 
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across a broader range of legitimate markets and activities. The nature of 
the risk to developed economies is that hierarchical influences within SOC 
will accordingly be protected behind a screen of legitimate companies 
whose success in legitimate markets is underwritten by criminal revenue 
streams.  This is the modern theatre of SOC influence and activity in Scot-
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